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COMPENSATION FOR TERRORISM:
WHAT WE ARE LEARNING
Marshall S. Shapo*
INTRODUCTION
My title, "Compensation for Terrorism: What We Are Learning"
reflects the humility that surely must affect us all as we probe this
subject. It suggests that our education will be in process for some time
to come.
I will specify and seek to tie together several strands of politics and
legal analysis that run through the problem. One of the many things
we are about here is an attempt to develop analytical categories that
will enable us to better rationalize the social response, so far, to the
issue of compensation for the events of September 11, 2001, and to
construct, in relatively unhurried fashion, a matrix for further re-
sponses. I speak principally to the fashioning of policy, but also to
outline some ideas on which courts may draw in judging disputes that
grow out of present and future legislation and regulations.
Among the topics that I will examine are:
(1) The emergence of a fragile political consensus;
(2) the need to develop principles from an ad hoc response to a
novel set of events of which we may have seen only the
beginning;
(3) the problem of identifying compensable events within a group
of concepts that are difficult to define both as matters of phi-
losophy and of law-categories like "misfortune" and
"accident";
(4) the definitions of both fault and responsibility;
(5) the possible need to redefine what we must assume to be the
ordinary burdens of life;
(6) the continuing challenge of placing currency valuations on in-
tangibles, including pain and affective relationships; and
(7) the especially difficult problem of how to respond to the surge
of emotion that has accompanied these events-a task that
colors many of the issues I have mentioned above.
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I frame these remarks with some personal views that began to
evolve on September 11, 2002, and the days immediately preceding
that anniversary. There was a particular irony about the media cover-
age of those days, particularly the television coverage. Although the
journalism of that period dealt with scenes of horror and episodes of
enormous grief, it seemed to me to depict these matters in tones too
pastel for reality. Representing some developing aspects of modern
culture, it presented an analogue of the idea of instant gratification
that I shall term instant closure. I simply reiterate a point others have
made when I say that it appears that closure, in the sentimental con-
notation the term has taken on in recent years, does not seem possible
with reference to these events. I suggest that we must consider the
subject of this Symposium, as we all must consider the much broader
topic that surrounds it, in the context of what may be a "long twilight
struggle." These observations color my views on the specific matters I
now discuss.
II. THE POLITICS OF COMPENSATION FOR TERROR
The legislation that sets up the September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund of 2001,1 and the rules that implement the Fund-especially
the first-cut Interim Rule,2 which in large part has become the Final
Rule 3-are remarkable documents. Created in an extraordinary cli-
mate of national emotion, and responding to many different kinds of
pleaders and the political pressures they brought to bear, the Fund
statute and the Rules represent the development of an uneasy consen-
sus about the obligations that a community under attack bears to its
citizens. They were the product of an unusually focused national col-
loquium among lay persons on a subject on which it is difficult to say
who the experts were, or are. Tocqueville was prescient: "[I]t is by
taking a share in legislation that the American learns to know the law;
it is by governing that he becomes educated about the formalities of
government. The great work of society is daily performed before his
eyes, and so to say, under his hands."'4
To read the legislation, as I have noted earlier, is to examine an
exercise in public choice, a multifaceted national mediation process in
1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115
Stat. 230, 231 (2001) [hereinafter Air Safety Act].
2. Interim Final Rule, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,282 (Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Interim Rule].
3. Final Rule, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(b)(2)
(2003) [hereinafter Final Rule].
4. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY i.q AMERICA 280 (George Lawrence trans., J.P.
Mayer & Max Lerner eds., 1966).
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which airlines, living victims, and families of the dead bring to Con-
gress their diverse plaints.5 To read the Rules, and to view television
films of the Special Master in intense exchanges with the victims'
groups,6 is to see Americans "becom[ing] educated about the formali-
ties of government" in living color.7 The receipt by the Justice De-
partment of "thousands of comments" on the Interim Rule 8 indicates
that democracy in Tocqueville's sense is very much a functioning insti-
tution. Jockeying by groups is historically part of the game, but this
response appears to have gone beyond that, evolving into a commu-
nity conversation about how to deal with fortuitous injuries.
III. THE PROBLEM OF PRINCIPLE
The legislation and the rules, so quickly fashioned, challenge the
analyst to find the informing principle beyond raw politics. Several
competing principles appear in the public debate about these docu-
ments as well as in the statute and rules themselves. We want to keep
the airlines flying. We also wish to preserve conventional tort rights
under traditional applications of negligence theory, but not to the
point that it ruins the airlines. At the same time, we desire a non-
litigation alternative for people whose lives are heavily stressed as it
is, even without the strain of a lawsuit. But even under that alterna-
tive, we want to preserve the traditional valuations of human life that
have been developed under tort law over a period of decades. We
want to accommodate all these desires in response to one calamitous
event.
The legislation is analogous to the early stages of common law de-
velopment. We respond to a first case in a particular fashion. We are
dimly aware that there may be more cases on the way with their own
grotesque wrinkles, so we try to justify what we have done in the first
case with some thought of the future. But anyone who has dealt in
administration at any level understands that a principle that sounds
good for just one case may not stand up as future cases arise, each
with its own peculiarities. The subsequent cases tend to force changes
in principle; and when the principle initially announced rests on a set
of complicated rationales, the principles developed for the next set of
5. Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence of In-
jury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245 (2002).
6. For several verbal cameos of these encounters, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 42.
7. Id.
8. See Final Rule, supra note 3, at 11,235.
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cases will become yet more nuanced-or occasionally, much more
blunt.
Basically, what we have done here is to print a ticket that covers
one set of events. We have muddled through, keeping principle in the
background, although the varied rationales for this legislation will
carry some momentum when we consider how to respond to future
events of this kind. But now we must start thinking about the limita-
tions that competing drains on scarce resources will impose, especially
if the economy is sluggish or dips over the long term and if terrorists
perpetrate more, and perhaps even more horrific, murders.
There are certainly reasons to have printed this particular ticket.
The unprecedented occasion of an attack on the continental United
States, together with the loss of thousands of lives, provides a founda-
tion for this ad hoc response. The sense of vulnerability and of in-
sult-at least the first time-bolsters the case. The particular horror
of people jumping out of 100-story buildings, the heroism of the
firefighters, and the images of the collapsing towers-all these things
were in the background when Congress acted.
On reflection, though, and thinking about the possibility of a next
time, we must give closer attention to the question of how we allocate
losses between victims and the polity in times of national disaster.
The issue becomes a subset of the vast question of what it means to be
an American, or even to sojourn in America.
In an earlier essay, I cited Churchill's decision to create a national
insurance scheme for damage from German bombs. He referred to
"the principle that all damage from the fire of the enemy must be a
charge upon the State and compensation be paid in full and at once." 9
But one can only speculate how Churchill would have reacted to com-
plaints from the bond firm Cantor Fitzgerald that a nontaxable award
of approximately $3 million to the survivors of a broker with an aver-
age income of $110,000 was insufficient. 10
Tort law has been criticized from the left as inegalitarian. 11 A dif-
ferent perspective appears in a criticism of the Special Master's sched-
ules and caps, from the perspective of a Cantor Fitzgerald formula
described as "us[ing] gross income and a more bullish estimate of fu-
ture earnings," that suggests that an award in such circumstances
9. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THEIR FINEST HOUR 349 (1949).
10. See David W. Chen, Worst-Hit Firm Faults Fairness of Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2002, at Al, B10.
11. See, e.g., Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 799 (1990) ("Tort
damages deliberately reproduce the existing distribution of wealth and income.").
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should be "closer to $5 million. 1 2 This critique represents quintes-
sential capitalism. Wherever one stands on the method of calculating
tort damages, however, one must confront the issue of what the
proper source is-or what the proper sources are-for compensation.
Given the availability of insurance that could have been financed by
the firm and used to cushion employees' losses in such an event, ar-
guably the best loss distributor, or at least a proper co-distributor,
would be private insurance. At least in a rough and ready way, the
schedules and caps may have defined the limits of the argument that
individual claimants are unique. They embody some recognition that
the Fund comes from the general revenues.
The Cantor Fitzgerald position is understandable from a business-
man's perspective. But Churchill, both a master practitioner and
scholar of politics, might have informed the firm that its position may
not be a winning one for someone scouting for tax money. For, in that
environment, the issue is entirely one of politics, requiring give-and-
take against the background of general perceptions of overall fairness.
IV. SORTING OUT MISFORTUNES
September 11th may well have been the beginning of an era in
which the resources available for misfortunes of all kinds will diminish
for some time. Demands for funds to protect against domestic terror-
ism appear to be insatiable. To take only two well-publicized exam-
ples, the gaps in port security alone would appear to require very large
expenditures, and both private enterprise and government already
have taken expensive steps to protect buildings. Moreover, at this
writing, it appears that these outlays are being dwarfed by the enor-
mous drain on the fisc of a war thousands of miles from home.
Arraying misfortunes on a deserts scale is a tricky business in any
event, and when afflicted persons seek to tap tax funds, the keepers of
the purse will surely ask where a particular set of events lies on that
scale. We should note that there has been an expansion of the scale
itself-of the definition of what people are willing to call misfortune.
Under a lens that focuses on individual harms, illness and injury are
the two most obvious occurrences. When we broaden the focus, we
come to natural disasters, wars-and major terrorist attacks. Broad-
ening it even more, we come to poverty, and eventually to the condi-
tions of one's birth, including not only the socioeconomic status of
one's family but also one's genetic inheritance. Each of these catego-
ries presents a different sort of potential claim on the Treasury.
12. Chen, supra note 10, at Al.
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When we open up the question of how we define misfortune, we are
enjoined by modern theory to scrutinize victims' opportunities to
avoid risk. However, looking at the case from the perspective of vic-
tims-and even taking into account foreseeability of some kind of at-
tack on the World Trade Center in particular13-I shall assume that
workers there and in the Pentagon could not have foreseen anything
like the dimensions of the terrorist destruction that occurred. From
that perspective, September 11th is clearly distinguishable from the
classic moral hazard of building on a flood plain. Indeed, a potential
distinction also appears between September llth and a future mass
murder by terrorists, at least one localized, as the events of September
l1th were, to particular structures. One new practical principle may
be that people holding or considering jobs in tall buildings should
blend an increased apprehension of risk into their choice of work-
place. I instance, purely anecdotally, a law student I know who had
job offers from two Chicago firms, one of which is located in the Sears
Tower. He told me that at least at the conscious margin of his decision
was a reluctance to work in a place that in the morbid popular mind
had become considered to be a possible target.
V. THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNITY
As we confront the question of how to compensate victims of terror
in general, apart from the unique features of September 11th, we must
ask what it means in our America to be a member of a community.
The bell "tolls for thee," although the clod John Donne specified as
falling was a patch of earth from the Old World. 14 But even if we
focus on our New World, and the proud towers of Lower Manhattan
that had so much become symbols of it, it is still incumbent on us to
ask about the modern relevance of the idea that any person's death
diminishes me because of my involvement in humanity. One may at
least argue that what is owed by the community to survivors of a per-
son who dies-in this particular setting from an attack-should be de-
termined on more of an egalitarian basis than one related to income.
It is at least reasonable to speculate that a seventeenth century divine
would have thought so.
It is clear that on some occasions the community is willing to devote
what many economists would call an inefficiently large amount of re-
sources to the rescue of people in peril. The most well publicized re-
cent example is that of the extraordinary efforts, conducted in full
13. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
14. See JOHN DONNE, COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN DONNE 441
(Charles M. Coffin ed., 1952).
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television view of an anxious nation, devoted to the rescue of nine
Pennsylvania miners.15 Of course, the definition of what an efficient
allocation is depends on what factors one plugs into the calculation-
including the incentive effects for miners to go back into the shafts. A
compelling analogy involves the willingness of soldiers to expose
themselves on the point if they know that they will not be left in no-
man's land if they are wounded. 16 Although I am mindful of the argu-
ment that, at some deep biological level, virtually all behavior is self-
ish,17 my personal intuition is that most rescuers act altruistically, or
that at least altruism is a very important element among a mixture of
motivations. However, I do not pursue that point here. Rather, I sim-
ply note that in conventional ways of thinking about self-interest, effi-
ciency analysis often does not rule in rescue situations.
Of course, common sense also tells us that the community will not
intervene to alleviate some misfortunes, whether they originate
natally or arise from vicissitudes. Always in the background of such
cases are pragmatic questions about frequency of occurrence and
about how many have been affected by the misfortune at issue. We
can tolerate the inefficient response for one or two episodes of
trapped miners, and there may be an outpouring of public support for
one set of octuplets because there are so few such events. At some
point, however, the polity will close the checkbook.
VI. PROBLEMS OF VALUATION
This discussion leads into a sensitive set of questions concerning
the valuation of claimants' interests in any case involving personal in-
jury, fatal or not. A perhaps under-emphasized fact is that one of the
hardest pieces of the puzzle in legal formulas that involve costs-ei-
ther cost-benefit tests or cost-cost tests like the Learned Hand
formula' 8-lies in the difficulty of defining accident costs. Think of
how facilely one may change the total economic cost of injuries by
using "gross income and a more bullish estimate of future earnings,"
Cantor Fitzgerald's suggestion about the proper basis for the Fund
schedules. 19 A difference of more than half again as much in eco-
15. See, e.g., Richard Benedetto, Miners Survival Celebrated, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 2002, at
6A.
16. See, e.g., Lewis LaRue, A Comment on Fried, Summers, and the Value of Life, 57 CORNELL
L. REv. 621, 625 (1972) (focusing on the morale of patrols whose wounded members require
rescue).
17. See, e.g., Richard Dawkins, God's Utility Function, Sci. AM., Nov. 1995, at 80 ("God's
Utility Function betrays its origins in an uncoordinated scramble for selfish gain.").
18. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
19. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 12.
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nomic costs alone-$5 million as against $3 million-might turn many
a tort case decided under the Hand test.
The difficulty becomes even greater with respect to the valuation of
intangibles. Certainly that is a task that tort law takes on every day all
over the country, in the most mundane cases involving pain and suf-
fering and in the most poignant cases involving the affective elements
of personal relationships. But if terrorism causing mass injuries should
become more than a one-time thing, increased numbers of injuries
may exert a powerful downward pressure on valuation, particularly
the valuation of intangibles. Modern tort law elevates a number of
intangibles to the same legal dignity as economic loss. But the same
body of law reflects a certain ambivalence about the reality of some
intangibles;20 and an assessment of the harm to feelings and a particu-
larized determination of their worth may be an inquiry that is among
the first to be jettisoned if terror becomes even an episodic part of
American life.
VII. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE PROBLEM
The Fund highlights the twists and turns within the general problem
of collateral sources. The statute begins this zig-zag pattern with a
particular piece of countertort subtlety. Within a rule requiring the
deduction of collateral sources from Fund compensation, it defines
life insurance as a collateral source. 21 Apparently savings are not. The
Final Rule specifies that charitable donations are not "collateral
source compensation," but it allows the Special Master to determine
that funds provided to victims or their families through privately
funded charitable entities are collateral sources. 22
These ad hoc rules exemplify the need to define the major premise.
The question posed extends across our various bodies of law designed
to compensate victims of injuries. Putting aside deterrence, is soci-
ety's main concern the loss of victims or their need? An apparent
principal premise of the statute is a compassionate one; and when dol-
lars are the currency of the law, is not the key to compassion a sensi-
tivity to need, rather than loss? Of course, divining the statutory
rationale is not that simple a task. Compassion itself may embody a
sense of "there but for the grace of God, go I." Moreover, Congress's
20. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70 (Ariz. 1979) ("Damages for emotional
disturbance alone are too speculative.") (dictum). I discuss this point in MARSHALL S. SHAPO,
TORT LAW AND CULTURE ch. 10 (2003).
21. Air Safety Act, supra note 1, § 402(4).
22. See Final Rule, supra note 3, § 104.47(b)(2) (tracking Interim Rule, supra note 2, at
66,287).
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creation of the Fund goes beyond compassion. The legislation articu-
lates society's solidarity with the victims and a sense of a community
united.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE MODELS
We now refer specifically to several models, which are not necessa-
rily exclusive, on which a legislature might draw in trying to solve this
multifaceted problem. One is the tort model. Its application in this
case ranges from the almost purely hypothetical to the colorably liti-
gable. The primary tortfeasors, individual perpetrators of intentional
torts, are dead, and any resources they might have had are presumably
unreachable. Investigation has yet to pin the murders to solvent avail-
able culprits. There are also potential causes of action, under Ameri-
can law as written, against a variety of private actors. First among
them are the airlines, whose financial difficulties are well-known and
who are indeed the beneficiaries of largesse under the same statute
that created the Fund.23 Claims might also exist against builders and
designers of buildings, but plaintiffs would face uphill fights from the
beginning on issues of standard of care and causation, including the
problem of multiple causes. Immunity aside, the government itself
would be a candidate for tort liability, but the well-publicized cases of
omissions to transmit, assess, or act on information relevant to Sep-
tember 11th seem largely to fall into discretionary function territory.24
At least to date, we have learned from Dalehite v. United States that
"[t]he King can do only little wrongs. '25
An event-related compensation model would paint from a palette
less varied than the tort palette, yielding a more monochromatic pic-
ture. One might describe such a scheme as an ad hoc workers' com-
pensation model because most of the victims were at work. The Fund,
as developed in the Rules, does have a "comp" aspect to it. This in-
cludes the use of schedules, although the level of compensation far
exceeds that available to the comp-covered worker maimed by an in-
dustrial machine.
The Fund represents an interesting negative variation on a true so-
cial insurance model. Such a model would require that claimants, or
their employers, or both, had paid into a fund before the event. Pre-
23. See Air Safety Act, supra note 1, §§ 101(a)(2) (granting federal compensation to air carri-
ers "for... direct losses ... as a result of any Federal ground stop order" and "incremental losses
incurred" through December 31, 2001 "as a direct result of such attacks"); 405(c)(3)(B)(i) (com-
pelling waiver of civil actions by persons who submit claims to the Fund); 408(a) (capping liabil-
ity at the "limits of the liability coverage maintained by the air carrier").
24. See infra text accompanying note 40.
25. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15. 60 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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sumably many of the victims of September 11th actually did that in
the form of FICA payments. The twist is that it appears that death
payments based on Social Security contributions are collateral
sources,2 6 and thus deductible from compensation awards under the
Fund.
A broad social welfare model for misfortunes in general, unspecified
in advance as to cause, probably would focus on need. The Fund par-
takes somewhat of the abstract social welfare idea, but bursts through
the need rationale with its linkage to income levels.
The New Zealand accident compensation scheme, which has gone
through a series of iterations, combines features of several models. 27
Its funding has been pinned partly to activities and partly to the gen-
eral revenues. 28 And it has generated penumbral legal questions of a
sort dear to the heart of torts teachers. Consider Geoffrey Palmer's
description of some interpretations of the definition of "accident"
under the New Zealand statute. A man was adjusting an exhaust pipe
on his vehicle while lying on his side. "He stood up and within a sec-
ond or two, suffered a stabbing pain in his lower back."'29 The claim-
ant did not recover because, as Palmer Summarizes it, "there was no
identifiable physical act or event leading to the injury."' 30 But a
woman who suffered a ruptured disc when she "bent down to plait her
daughter's hair and sneezed" did get compensation.31 On review, this
event was held an accident under the statute: "the physical act did not
need to be external to [the] body because 'there may be some occa-
sions when the precipitating physical act may occur spontaneously as,
for example, if a person dislocated his shoulder when throwing a
cricket ball.'"32
When tribunals split hairs like these on inter-event comparisons, it
would not be surprising to find lawyers applying refinements at least
as subtle to interpersonal comparisons that involve projections of in-
come levels-or the value of affective relationships.
26. See Air Safety Act, supra note 1, § 402(4) ("Collateral source" includes "all collateral
sources, including ... death benefit programs.").
27. See, e.g., Michael Whincup, Compensation for Accident Victims: The Exemplary Model of
New Zealand, 7 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 497 (1984). For comprehensive commentary on the New
Zealand scheme, collected in twenty articles, see 34 VICTORIA UNIV. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 2
(2003).
28. See Whincup, supra at 500-01.
29. GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 251 (1979).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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IX. FAULT AND RESPONSIBILITY
The probabilities of recovering significant amounts in tort seem
quite uncertain for both living victims and survivors. Acknowledging
that the chances for such claimants to succeed may be more theoreti-
cal than practical, we should observe that the events of September
11th pose a fascinating set of questions about the meaning of negli-
gence. A principal touchstone of negligence is foreseeability, 33 a con-
cept that a federal district court judge has employed to the advantage
of September 11th claimants in the preliminary stage of tort suits.
However, hindsight knowledge, especially projected through the lens
of modern media, has powerful potential for claimants to translate it
into the language of foresight. One of the most celebrated allegations
concerning governmental responsibility arises from the report that an
instructor at a flight school in Minnesota "called the FBI several
times" to warn about the threat he perceived from one of his students,
Zacarias Moussaoui, who was indicted on charges that he was the
"20th hijacker. '34 A member of Congress said that the instructor had
specifically asked FBI agents, "Do you realize that a 747 loaded with
fuel can be used as a bomb?" 35
Even in material widely circulated before the summer of 2001, harb-
ingers abound. Purely illustrative, in fiction at that, is a thriller by
Nelson DeMille that contains at least three references to the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center as an exemplar of terrorism. 36
Consider one particularly vivid passage in the novel, which was pub-
lished in 2000. DeMille's noir hero and narrator, John Corey, is look-
ing toward the Center from the office of Koenig, the fictional head of
the FBI's anti-terrorist task force for the New York area. Corey says
that Koenig's
desk was arranged so that every time he looked out the window, he
could see these towers, and he could contemplate what some Arab
gentlemen had prayed for when they had driven an explosive-filled
van into the basement parking garage-namely, the collapse of the
33. See In re Sept. 11th Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see, e.g., id. at 295-97
(claims against aviation defendants for injuries to "ground victims"), 300-01 (claims against
World Trade Center owners and operators).
34. Philip Shenon, Moussaoui Could Be Terrorist, Flight Trainer Warned FBI, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
23, 2001, § 1, at 4.
35. Id. See also Philip Shenon, Early Warnings on Moussaoui Are Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2002, at A13 (quoting report of special House-Senate intelligence committee about flight
instructors' suspicions about Moussaoui's lack of a pilot's license, his desire for training on a
Boeing 747, and the fact that he was "extremely interested in the operations of the plane's doors
and control panel").
36. NELSON DEMILLE, THE LION'S GAME (2000).
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South Tower and the death of over fifty thousand people in the
tower and on the ground.
And if the South Tower had collapsed just right and hit the North
Tower, there would have been another forty or fifty thousand
dead.37
Corey concludes that "[w]hat could have been the biggest loss of
American life since World War II turned out to be a loud and clear
wake-up call."'38 Legal negligence is all in the proof, under the rules of
evidence, but here at least is a pre-September 11th literary suggestion
that reasonable persons in possession of the Moussaoui evidence
would have been alerted to the risk that terrorists might fly planes
into the World Trade Center. If the government were considered sim-
ply as a private actor, knowledge of that kind on the part of its offi-
cials might well be grounds for a tort claim. 39 And although
presumably the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act would bar actions against the United States by families of
September 11th victims, 40 it may be noted that often the essence of
the tort culpability of companies is a discretionary decision by highly
placed corporate officials. 41
There is no hint of acknowledgment of this point in the Fund stat-
ute, but revelations after its passage suggest that it now comes to re-
present a kind of expiation by the government itself.
37. Id. at 219.
38. Id. For other references in the same book see id. at 15 (using the words "World Trade
Center" as a phrase evoking the meaning "Remember Pearl Harbor" to members of the anti-
terrorism task force, concerning which DeMille's hero comments, "[t]he intelligence community
got caught with their pants down on that one, but came back and solved the case, so it was a
draw"); id. at 47 (saying that terrorists "are dangerous, but mostly to themselves," the narrator
immediately muses, "[b]ut then again, remember the World Trade Center").
39. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b) (2003) (conferring jurisdiction on
federal district courts for claims against the United States "under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant"), 2674 (imposing liability on
the Government "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances").
40. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (2003) (exempting from liability claims against the Government
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency").
41. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 739-41 (Minn. 1980) (affirming
punitive award in case involving burns from pajamas that ignited when, thirteen years before the
event sued upon, a "top official" of the defendant had circulated an internal memorandum ex-
pressing concern about the flammability of the fabric).
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X. COMPARATIVE HORRORS
One must be careful in comparing injuries across categories of ac-
tivities,42 but in some cases such comparisons may prove instructive. 43
Perhaps the most striking statistic for comparison, in analyzing a
unique catastrophe where the draft drawn by claimants will be on the
general revenues, is that of the overall annual death toll from acci-
dents in the United States. I select the category of accidents, for com-
parison with a situation of mass deaths caused by the most diabolical
intentional torts, precisely because of the fortuity of the deaths and
injuries of September 11th from the victims' point of view. The an-
nual number of fatalities in this country from "unintentional injuries"
in 2001-a figure that startles most people to whom the question is
put without preparation-is 98,000.44 This number may not entirely
surprise those to whom the consistent recent toll of motoring fatalities
alone is a commonplace statistic: in the low 40,OOOs. 45
Putting aside the nationally calamitous aspects of the attacks, one is
entitled to ask whether an office worker's horror at seeing a plane
coming at the ninety-seventh floor of the North Tower is greater than
that of the motorist who sees an oncoming car jump the median and,
for a few yards, literally fly at him or her. It seems reasonable to
believe that, in their last moments, the victims in the Towers were not
conceptualizing the insult to the national community of an attack on
the homeland but rather coping with their own private hells. It is
clear that in cold statistical terms, the annual accident toll in the
United States dwarfs that of the attacks. Beyond that, viewing Sep-
tember 11th from the standpoint of the victims, it is not manifest that
the awfulness of their deaths was qualitatively worse than that of the
more than 90,000 of their countrypersons who died from accidents in
2001.
The other principal statistical analogy is a military one. Mr.
DeMille's hero comments that after the 1993 bombing of the Trade
Center, "America had become the front lines."' 46 But a datum that
puts September 11th in longer historical perspective is the death toll in
42. See Bittner v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 533 N.W.2d 476, 486-87 (Wis. 1995) (barring use of
evidence that "compared the risk of injury and death associated with [all-terrain vehicles] to the
risk of injury and death associated with products and activities including skiing, bicycle riding,
scuba diving, football, and passenger automobiles").
43. See id. (approving the use of evidence comparing injury rates of ATVs with those of snow-
mobiles, minibikes, and trailbikes, classifying all these products as "off-road motorized
vehicles").
44. See NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 8 (2002).
45. See id. (reporting motoring fatalities at 42,900 in 2001).
46. DEMILLE, supra note 36, at 219.
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the abattoir that was Antietam: the combined fatalities of Union and
Confederate soldiers resulting from that battle totaled between 6,300
and 7,600. 4 7 It has been observed that the lower figure is not only
double the total deaths on September 11th, but four times that of
American forces on the Normandy beaches on D-Day.48
The numbers just recounted simply emphasize that violent death is
a statistical norm on American highways and in our homes and work-
places, as well as in national defense. This means that insofar as we
are all involved in the humanity of America, it is necessary to rational-
ize our choices to grant social compensation for traumatic misfortune.
Even if there were an injury Tsar who sat at a great control board
every minute of every day, constantly figuring and refiguring the dis-
tributive justice of compensation for such events, this would be a chal-
lenge indeed. But as I have previously noted, Americans have no
Tsar,49 and so the challenge is even more daunting. In fact, in prac-
tice, a truly comprehensive solution is a chimera. The profile of com-
pensation is always a jagged one. The statute that creates the Fund is
simply one more example-admirable in its intention-of Yankee
muddling through.
Well over two years beyond September 11, 2001, we are indeed still
climbing upwards on a steep learning curve. As we look apprehen-
sively to possible future horrors, 50 we must continue to think through
how to deal with the compensation problems that are likely to arise
from a long war with an ununiformed enemy that strikes in calculat-
edly unpredictable ways. We have noted that the situation, viewed
parochially only from a tort standpoint, is one in which immunities
cloak many of the domestic actors who would conventionally be seen
as culpable. It seems reasonable to predict that if attacks of this sort
occur again, we will witness further fragmentation of our injury law
beyond tort and the type of statutory compensation systems that have
been in place for almost a century. Whether or not any future legisla-
tion still makes room for tort actions as the present Fund legislation
does, compensation for terrorism will probably become more and
more the province of Congress. And the parameters of compensation
47. The higher figure appears in Antietam battlefield information, available at http://
www.nps.gov/anti/battle.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
48. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, GRANT 219n (Touchstone ed. 2002); James McPherson, Death
in September, CHRON. HiGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 2002, at B8.
49. See Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Reform: The Problem of the Missing Tsar, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 185 (1990).
50. See, e.g., Excerpts from Testimony by C.I.A. and F.B.I. Leaders About Sept. 11, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 18, 2002, at A12 (excerpting transcript of statement of C.I.A. Director George
Tenet, including assertion that "the threat environment we find ourselves in today is as bad as it
was last summer, the summer before 9/11").
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are likely at once to become more sharply defined-as to the amounts
available to individual claimants-and to become less legally refined,
for example, with reference to traditional concepts of culpability and
causation. The delicate consensus supporting the Fund statute and
Rules, with their options and their particularized schedules and exclu-
sions, may prove to hold for the events of one day only.
XI. SENTIMENT: ITS LIMITATIONS AND ITS PROPER PROVINCE
Our topic is one with high emotional content. As we seek to dis-
cern the rationales for the Fund, as legislated and elaborated in the
Rules, it is well to draw back and reflect on the roots of whatever
consensus exists. The sentimentality of much media programming is
understandable, probably reflective of national moods. In the wake of
September 11th, the most coolly rational among us must have exper-
ienced some waves of perturbation that included the maudlin-some
tendency to nod as journalists ask survivors why they think they were
"saved," 51 as if some deity had selected them for life while designating
others, closely situated to them, for destruction.
Some will emphasize that sentiment takes us only a little bit of the
way to understanding, to a point where rationality takes over and car-
ries us all the rest of the way. I offer a somewhat more complex ex-
planation of the initial solution represented by the Fund. It is one
which moves from sentiment to conventional rationality but then be-
yond that to a kind of rationalized emotion.
Congress reacted to September 11th with a combination of senti-
ment and a surprising specificity of social engineering. The overall
statute, including the "Airline Stabilization" section, 52 was a hurried
attempt to balance the interests of many very interested parties. It
provides federally funded compensation for injured survivors and the
relatives of those who died, direct subsidies to air carriers for eco-
nomic losses, and an ad hoc resolution of the problems generally
posed by the grinding of the tectonic plates of tort and compensation
systems. 53
This is a rational set of solutions-politically rational. It is truly a
public choice. But there is an element of that choice with some com-
plex psychological coils-one that appears to justify the Fund on a
51. See Hanna Rosin, All Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 2002, at 12 (reporting broadcaster
Connie Chung's question to chef who worked on 106th floor of North Tower, but was getting his
glasses fixed in the basement concourse when a hijacked plane hit the tower, "Why do you think
you were saved?").
52. Air Safety Act, supra note 1, tit. I.
53. See generally Shapo, supra note 5 at 1245.
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basis to which it is not logically linked, at least not on traditional axes
of reasoning. I suggested in an earlier essay that "the statute ... re-
flects an unfocused desire to strike out against a particularly awful set
of life's misfortunes, events burdening the national soul with a recog-
nition that retribution is not available on behalf of the victims-or the
nation-in any tit-for-tat manner. '54
Since writing that, I believe I have gained more understanding of
the subject from an almost fortuitous visit to the site of the World
Trade Center. That occurred on a June 2002 trip to New York City for
other reasons, which included a visit to Lower Manhattan to see both
a publisher's representative and a relative. It was the publisher's rep-
resentative who urged me to go to the site. I had not planned to visit
it because I thought there was little that its appearance at that time
would add to what I had read, seen on television, and heard. I was
wrong, and the greatest single impact from my visit came just before I
saw the site itself. It occurred after I had come up from the subway,
when I was walking south along the opaque fence that enclosed the
east side of the site. As I looked up above the fence, it came to me in
the most affecting way that two enormous structures used to stand
there and that they, and thousands of their worktime inhabitants,
were gone forever.
All of this bubbled up in my consciousness in the space of no more
than a minute or so. What also surged in me, repetitively of thoughts
in months past but with extraordinary emotional power, were
thoughts of the diabolical plan and the simple execution of that plan
by no more than a platoon that had brought about the events of Sep-
tember 11th. And there, walking along the fence before I saw the site,
now no longer smoking and somewhat smoothed out but still
cavernous, I experienced a feeling for which words are not really
adequate.
The best word I can summon is rage. That is a word beyond the
desiccated dialogue of the law journal. But I think that a rationalized
version of that emotion-beyond traditional notions of reason, with-
out direct logical linkage to the perpetrators-was a vital component
of the psychology that inspired the Fund. We were enraged, and we
wanted to do something-at least something for somebody, if not
against somebody. If there are next times, we will be cooler in our
response in the doing-for category. But on this first occasion, Con-
gress spoke for the community with a meaning that outstrips the wis-
dom of conventional analysis.
54. Id. at 1252.
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